|
The Naturalism of Hursthouse’s Virtue Theory: A Nietzschean Challenge
September 22, 2004
Situating Hursthouse’s Position
In her book, On Virtue Ethics1, Rosalind Hursthouse articulates a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that draws on how most of us think about morality and how children are taught and raised. While she brings out the role of emotions and motivation in ethical thinking, it is the third part of her book---which focuses on rationality---that I will focus on here, with particular to her final chapter on objectivity in ethics. Objectivity, for Hursthouse, is to be found in human nature and the way human beings live. Her ethical naturalism is informed by an analysis of both plants and non-human animals and how individuals and species survive and develop. It is her “third thesis,” that human nature is harmonious, that I raise a Nietzschean objection to, calling into question whether there is one distinct human nature that ties the individual and social ends together and may provide a list of virtues applicable to all people.2 The Nietzschean objection relies on a hierarchy of types, and two main divisions of people---the weak and the strong. “Strong virtues” challenge Hursthouse’s framework and threaten to tear the individual and the social apart in her theory. I will then examine the avenues Hursthouse may take to counter this objection, while also exploring what some other virtue theorists have said in response to the Nietzschean objection.3 I believe that the Nietzschean challenge may inform Hursthouse’s ethical outlook without destroying it, and that such revision also develops a possible Nietzschean virtue ethic that challenges some of the more traditional interpretations of what Nietzsche says about the ethical enterprise.4 Hursthouse’s ethical outlook may be informed by exploring what “strong virtues” are and how the strong may actually appropriate the “weak virtues” of pity, compassion, and charity. Also Hursthouse may have to address the issue of different human types and the fact that virtues may benefit human beings qua type. While the objection will still point to some conflict between the individual and social ends, this conflict in no way destroys the main thrust of Hursthouse’s position, and, I believe, offers the possibility for enhancement of her theory.
Hursthouse on Human Nature and Objectivity
In discussing the nature of plants and non-human animals, Hursthouse develops four “aspects” that are relevant for what the plant or animal does, or must do, according to nature. She, following Foot, lists two aspects that serve two ends which plants can be evaluated by. The two aspects are (i) parts (roots, stem, leaves, etc.) and (ii) operations/reactions (growing, absorbing water, setting seed, etc.). The two ends are (1) individual survival and (2) continuance of the species (for example seed-setting). Moving on to animals, Hursthouse introduces two new aspects and two further ends. The two aspects are (iii) actions, and (iv) emotions/desires, while the two further ends are (3) characteristic pleasure/characteristic freedom from pain, and (4) the good functioning of the social group (that is, to enable the members of the group to live well and flourish in a way that is characteristic of the species).5
Before moving on to humans, what “characteristic” means deserves some discussion. For example, it is characteristic that worker bees dance to tell other bees where there is nectar. It is characteristic for wolves to hunt in packs. A worker bee that does not signal to others, and a “free-riding” wolf that does not join in the hunt are not behaving in a way that is characteristic for their species. Animals do certain things and have certain abilities that allow them to achieve the ends of individual survival, species survival, characteristic pleasure/freedom from pain, and, in the social animals (like wolves), the good functioning of the social group. These characteristics are species-specific.
Human beings have another aspect.6 Humans are (v) rational beings, that is, they do not merely act out of inclination like the other animals do. Rather, humans deliberate and make choices, and the actions humans carry out are generally done because of the reasons for doing a particular action that are stronger than the reasons for doing something else. Reason introduces complexity in evaluation. Because it is of our nature to not merely act from inclination and “animal” nature, we cannot be evaluated by health or sickness, good-endowment or defect, but by the choices we make according to our reason. 7 We are different due to our rationality, that is, “there is no knowing what we can do from what we do do.”8 There is this sort of openness and flexibility due to our ability to reason and make choices after deliberation. So, along with our strictly “animal” nature of (i-iv), there also is this fifth aspect, rationality, which is the strongest distinction, according to Hursthouse, with regard to how humans go about achieving the four ends. The complexity of human beings increases the indeterminacy regarding what the characteristic way to live for the human is, as compared to other animals who do not have reason. There are a variety of ways humans live their lives. Some people are parents and some are not, thus the virtue of good parenting does not apply to everyone. Yet, even though there is this variation and degree of indeterminacy, there is still the objectivity of nature and the four ends. It will now be necessary to get a firmer grasp on what this objectivity in ethics amounts to for Hursthouse as it is the chief complaint the Nietzschean may bring forth against her.
Hursthouse begins the final chapter of her book with a general discussion about objectivity’s place in ethical theory and how virtue theory tackles the subjective/objective question. The truth of the rightness of some action depends on what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in some situation. The “truth of that is dependent upon (i) what an agent with a certain character trait would do in the circumstances and (ii) whether that character trait is a virtue”9 Whether or not this character trait is a virtue depends on its conduciveness to the four naturalistic ends (individual survival, species survival, characteristic pleasure/freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group). Virtue ethics, according to Hursthouse, denies the Kantian objectivity of ethics (acceptance of statements in accord with practical reason), and also the necessarily empirical objectivity regarding moral facts. Hursthouse says that virtue theory relies on a “kind of objectivity appropriate to the subject matter.”10 I take it that this “appropriateness” refers to the role character traits play in human life and the coherence with the empirical and other facts of which virtue theory make use.
Hursthouse proceeds by discussing ethical disagreements. She maintains that the fundamental issue regarding objectivity in ethical theory is whether or not disagreements are disagreements about facts or values (about which we are to remain silent). She provides the example of whether or not, within the context of naturalism, temperance with respect to sex is a virtue. Some say it is, others say it is not. Is this a disagreement about facts or values? Hursthouse claims that it is indeed about facts, and, in fact, about human nature. The disagreement is over how human life is lived characteristically. It is this question regarding human nature that is a segue way into her “three theses”, and, in particular, the third thesis regarding the harmoniousness of human nature.
Hursthouse’s Three Theses
Hursthouse dubs her three theses, “Plato’s requirements on the virtues.” These three theses are:
- The virtues benefit their possessor (flourish).
- The virtues make their possessor a good human being qua human being (flourish as human beings).
- These two features are interrelated.11
The third thesis is necessary if Hursthouse’s individual and social ends are to stick together, that is, the first and third ends (individual survival and pleasure/freedom from pain) and the second and fourth ends (species survival and good functioning of the social group) fall apart if (3) does not hold. The third thesis is vitally important because Hursthouse says that both (1) and (2) “can get off the ground; that, not independently, but in combination, they provide us with the framework within which we can set about trying to validate our beliefs about which character traits are the virtues.”12 The third thesis is the crux of her theory since it allows her a position from which she can delineate which character traits are virtues.
Hursthouse provides two examples of responses when someone is asked the question “What’s good about the character trait of honesty?’ The first response really involves ‘What is good, for me, about my being honest?’ It is out of prudence that one does not lie because “People know and you just look a fool . . .It’s such an essential part of good relationships that there should be trust between you . . . And it’s essential to doing philosophy and teaching it well. . . .”13 The second response brings out the importance of honesty for human life and reliance on one another in intimate relationship and to maintain institutions and learn. This second response, Hursthouse claims, is more of a response to ‘Why does honesty makes it possessor a good human being?’ I am not sure that this is the most accurate question in accordance with the answer given. What the answer given seems to be in response to is the role of honesty in societal life and in discourse with other people. Hursthouse here does seem to lose some precision in stating that the appropriate question is about what it takes to be a good human being qua human being. A suppressed premise appears to be here, namely that the goodness of honesty for societal life is the goodness for human beings qua human beings. This is a picky complaint, but one that serves to clarify Hursthouse’s account in this passage.
Hursthouse uses these two responses to illustrate the interrelation between the first and second thesis (thus illustrating the third thesis). She writes:
Answer (ii) implicitly makes some claims about what is important in human life---trusting each other and forming intimate relationships, running various institutions such as universities where we learn from each other---which (i) implicitly endorses as personal views about what is part of my flourishing. If only wildly eccentric human beings would hold the personal views expressed in (i), (ii)’s claims about what is important in human life would be implausible. And (i) relies on (ii)’s claim about how human life works. It assumes that honesty is needed in close human relationships; it assumes that it is needed for human beings to learn from each other.14
The individual, in asserting, why honesty is good for him or her relies on how good human interaction qua human interaction works. The response along the lines of the “characteristically good human life” depends a lot on how individuals recognize the virtues as being beneficial to themselves as individuals as well.
With regard to ethical disagreements, Hursthouse maintains that, in her example of sexual temperance, there is a large degree of agreement over the three theses. Both sides think their candidate virtue is indeed a virtue, both believe that its possessor is good qua human being, and both believe that these two features are closely related. Yet there is a conflict between the ways that self-control (the third end of personal pleasure/freedom from pain) with respect to sex conduces well with the first, second, and fourth ends. With regard to sexual temperance versus licentiousness, the disagreement, according to Hursthouse, is “over the extent to which either character trait endows one well with respect to, particularly the third end.”15 As Hursthouse acknowledges, this opens up the threat of conflict between the individual ends (1 and 3) and the social ends (2 and 4) with regard to human beings (since we have rationality and act on reasons and are thus different than other animals). Thus a conflict in that interrelationship of the individual and social with respect to the good life, which is crucial for Hursthouse’s theory, opens up. Can ethical naturalism have a good response to one who holds that there is this conflict between the individual and the social whole? The egoist will say that the individual is where virtues and values arise from first and foremost and he or she does not have to abide by the social at all or have any altruistic concerns whatsoever. The egoist can say that Hursthouse’s third thesis means nothing to them since there is no necessary link (or perhaps no real link at all) between how the individual benefits and how the human species or social group as a whole.
Wishing to pursue this line of thinking, Hursthouse raises three concerns about the third thesis. The first one is what I call the “Glaucon-Adimantus-Thrasymachus” objection since it comes from Plato’s Republic. The objection is that humans are biologically such that they naturally have no regard for anyone but themselves, and all moral upbringing that inculcates the virtues disfigures the natural human, producing defective people instead of good ones. Hursthouse makes short order of this objection by reducing it to absurdity---it is a wildly antisocial account of human nature that seems to deny the possibility of having children and fails to recognize how much social-co-operation is present for civilization to exist at all. The third objection is the “supposed threat from Darwinism” which presents a picture of humanity that Hursthouse simply rejects because she claims it is overwhelmingly pessimistic. The “Darwinian” view is that humans are, in some sense, “a mess” and that there is no possibility for much other than consistent moral failure due to our limited nature as evolving animals. I do not think this view is really that much of an objection since even if we are, in some sense, “a mess” I do not think that one can only thus collapse into despair without any possibility of hope for humanity and the virtues. So, here I will disregard these two objections and will instead focus on the second objection (as Hursthouse presents it) to the third thesis. This is the Nietzschean objection.
The Nietzschean Objection
As Hursthouse notes, both Nietzscheans and Ayn Randian objectivists challenge the notion that there could be a single set of virtues for all people.16 For both, it is the individual that is the base of all values and virtues. I will focus on the Nietzschean line here. “A virtue has to be our invention, our most personal defense and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger.”17 A virtue can only belong to the one who creates it over and against the social group.18 This stems from Nietzsche’s distinction, as Hursthouse mentions, between the “strong” and the “weak.” Those who are strong are the “free spirits” who accept no rules from others, and who seek to make exceptions of themselves. Those who are weak are the members of the herd who take themselves to be fundamentally “just like everyone else.” There are two types19 of people needing different types of moral evaluation. The good weak human beings may have the familiar virtues that Hursthouse thinks all virtuous people should have, but the good strong human beings may have some of the character traits normally listed as vices since these strong types have a different nature and “play” by different rules. These strong human beings are exceptions to the standard of virtue. These strong human beings are, for the most part, solitary and achieve self-realization only by denying the social group. For such individuals, the third end---individual fulfillment---is in opposition to the fourth end of the good for the social whole. These strong human beings flourish through “injustice and callousness and perhaps other vices on the standard list as well”20. Of particular note are the virtues of pity, charity, and compassion. These virtues are, generally21, signs of weakness, according to Nietzsche. The strong are unconcerned, mocking, and even violent, but they are so by their nature. There are thus different moralities rooted in the different needs and desires of different people.
Generalizing this objection, we see that there may be a tension between those ends which serve the individual and those which serve the social whole, thus separating the first thesis from the second thesis. Moreover, the reason for this is that there is no fixed human nature as such that could provide a framework for objective, universal virtues for all human beings. Instead there may be multiple natures that give rise to different sets of virtues. Evidence for this may lie in the wide range of characteristics people express, and even the wide range of roles people play in society. There are some people who seek power, wealth, and recognition, while others seek to remain rather anonymous and do not care about accumulating much wealth or power at all. Different people express a wide range of abilities, desires, goals, and personalities and it may be extremely difficult to find a single nature that covers all of the population. Now with this account of diversity, Hursthouse agrees. Hursthouse recognizes that there is a great deal of variation between people. It is very difficult to determine how good some person is just by assessing one or a group of virtues that they express, that is, people express some virtues more so than other virtues. Furthermore, in trying to determine between two people who is more virtuous, the matter gets even more complex. While one person may be, on the whole, more honest, the other may be more generous, etc. Also, there are virtues such as good parenting that obviously need not be expressed by those who are not parents. So Hursthouse does allow for variation and no strict single list of virtues to actually be applied to all people.
Yet, the Nietzschean wants to take this variation further. We could say, generally speaking, that the weak and the strong break along power-divides. The strong are those in power, or who exert power, attain notoriety, etc. This would include politicians, CEOs, some religious figures, some artists, etc. The weak would be the common person who does not seek to attain any real social, economic, political, or cultural power. But how might people express different virtues according to these difference in their natures?
Take the rock musician, the priest, and the politician. In what follows, I will of course be generalizing and I do not mean that everyone in these three groups express these virtues. Also, I do not want to give the impression that nature is wholly deterministic, but that nature plays a significant role in how people are the way they are. In any event, the rock musician, the priest, and the politician express very different virtues.22 Rock musicians are often notoriously not temperate, instead living life to excess. Rock musicians seek fame and recognition. They are often callous, selfish, and rude. Theses characteristics run counter to the traditional virtues of temperance, generosity, and charity. Yet there is something we generally like about these people. They seem to have their own rules and appeal to us in a certain way, even if they do not express the traditional virtues as such. Now look at the priest. The priest is, generally speaking, temperate, generous, and devotes much of his life to charity and compassion. He will very rarely seek fame and recognition. The politician seeks power and positions of authority. He or she may do so to “do good” for people, but he or she may also be dishonest and disloyal in achieving power status. The sort of Machiavellian approach to politics is based on a façade, for the most part, and there is a “whatever it takes” attitude in the political arena. Within this context it is often assumed that some of the virtues may be discarded in the name of achieving a certain status.
There are many more examples that one could explore, including the soldier, the gangster (to use one of Hursthouse’s examples), the clown, etc. The point is that I do not think that the variation of virtue expression that Hursthouse allows matches the actual variation expressed by individuals. People with different natures may express different virtues, and require a different moral evaluation altogether. We may not judge the rock star, the priest, and the politician along the same lines (as well as all the other possible examples).
With this kind of variation of it is hard to imagine that there is some unified characteristic way for humans to live, since for all her allowing of variation, Hursthouse does need some kind of unification of human nature, according to her second thesis. Rationality is one unifying factor, but it itself does not provide much detail with regard to how various people may go about their lives and express the virtues. Individuals qua individuals may be expressing the virtues according to their nature, and their expression may run counter to what is good for the social whole or what could be considered the way humans, to some degree, characteristically live. There is a tension between the ends serving the individual and those serving the social group. This puts serious strain on Hursthouse’s third thesis since there will be some individuals whose virtues may not coincide with the “characteristically good human life.”
I see little reason to expect moral attributes to be much different than these other natural attributes previously mentioned. Notice that this objection lies within the ethical outlook of naturalism---it is still a matter of the nature of human beings, but there are natural differences (for example in natural abilities, self-mastery, self-legislation, etc.) within the human population. When taking these natural differences into account, a theory of virtues that provided one standard of evaluation across the entire population may itself be unjust to those who have affirmed their own virtues and know how to find their own advantage or know what they want and how to attain what they want by their very nature (For Nietzsche, the dictum ‘Not to seek one’s own advantage’ is a statement masking the actual ‘I no longer know how to find my own advantage’23).
Potential Replies for Hursthouse
Hursthouse is left with two options. First, she can respond to the Nietzschean on his or her terms, or, since the Nietzschean may not be within Hursthouse’s ethical outlook, she can focus her response toward those who share her ethical outlook. The latter type of response allows Hursthouse to frame the discussion in her terms, and although she does say that the Nietzschean objection may “refigure our ethical outlook somewhat,”24 she may be able to respond adequately to the Nietzschean in her own terms.
To respond to the Nietzschean on the Nietzschean’s terms would require an exegetical interpretation of what Nietzsche has to say about morality, and there is wide debate regarding that.25 To respond to the Nietzschean in Hursthouse’s own terms would involve a potential refiguring of the notions of, for example, compassion and pity (those “weak” virtues according to the Nietzschean) and asking oneself if there is room for “strong” virtues within Hursthouse’s ethical outlook. This is a complicated matter, and both Philippa Foot and Christine Swanton have done some work there.26 I will present Swanton’s discussion of this matter below, but first I will examine the few things that Hursthouse herself says about Nietzsche and the “immoralist” who challenges her position.27
Hursthouse recognizes that the Nietzschean objection is not like “Glaucon-Adimantus-Thrasymachus” objection in that, for the Nietzschean, the strong need the weak ones around to keep society going. Hursthouse acknowledges that the Nietzschean objection “promises to refigure our ethical outlook somewhat.”28 It is important to realize that this refiguring is just that, that is, it is a revision and not either a mere re-expression of the ethical outlook nor a abandonment of the outlook. To take the Nietzschean seriously is to engage in genuine scrutiny of one’s own outlook, replacing it “plank by plank” while still relying on the structure of the outlook for support. If the Nietzschean challenge causes a change in the outlook it is a real change, not a mere re-expression of the outlook. Hursthouse sees that alteration of some concepts such as compassion and justice may need revision. Unfortunately she does not develop the Nietzschean view and demonstrate how she can utilize the Nietzschean challenge to enhance her theory in this way. She states that there are exceptional individuals29 who and that we admire these individuals, in part, due to their individuality. The mere appearance of these exceptional individuals who do not obey “the rules” yet achieve great things is attractive and urges the virtue theorist to take the Nietzschean seriously.
What Hursthouse does say that may be a response to the Nietzschean is what she says earlier in the book about the “immoralist” as such who ignores the virtuous claiming that those are virtuous have “paltry, or pathetic, or despicable”30 enjoyments and satisfactions. It is definitely true that, for the Nietzschean, the strong may see “the weak herd” in this way. What is important here (and I hope will become clearer below) is that the difference or disagreement between Hursthouse and the Nietzschean is not about values, but about the facts of human nature. A disagreement about values may leave the participants in the dispute at a standstill. The facts of “human nature and how human life works”31 are not strictly neutral, but come out through an ethical perspective. That such facts are not “available from within a neutral point of view---is, as far as I know, quite unrecognized in the current literature.”32 It may be unrecognized in the current literature, but Nietzsche expressed this very same view throughout his life. Facts, for him, always come through a perspective. Now Hursthouse obviously does not want to say that all moral facts cannot be determined from a neutral point of view, but the point is made that there is some definite similarity on this point between Hursthouse and Nietzsche regarding some moral facts, namely those associated with human nature.
Christine Swanton has taken up the Nietzschean challenge to virtue theory, and I think her response also may work as a response for Hursthouse. Swanton starts from the premise that Nietzsche does endorse some form of altruism. As Swanton says, Nietzsche’s “attack on a certain kind of altruism is premised on the assumption that the targeted kind involves a deficiency of self affirmation, indeed of life affirmation..”33 The decadent, weak altruist has a “spiritual hole” that is filled by trying to live for others, while the strong ‘overfull’ person whose “altruism expresses the value of life, including the agent’s own.”34 The strong type gives as an outpouring of excess life not out of pity which only increases total suffering in the world as the pitying person feels bad for another’s plight. Swanton rightly believes that this idea of strength should be normatized, and this is where Hursthouse could open the discussion with the Nietzschean. The Nietzschean first would have to distinguish between good and bad expressions of strength, otherwise there is little that can be said between the two. The expression of strength as such is not good or virtuous, but as Swanton writes, “what is good or virtuous is exercising or manifesting will to power [strength] well.”35 Perhaps certain people are by nature different and perhaps require a different standard of evaluation, but not an altogether different standard. The discussion could then develop along issues of violence and justice, and Hursthouse would help herself greatly by developing some theory of justice within ethical naturalism.
Can the Nietzschean say that all of the “gentle” virtues may be reduced to the strong virtues and the expressions of power and energy well? The short answer is no, because the point of other-regarding virtues is that they are based on something about the other, not merely the expression of excess life by he or she who gives. “To understand what it is to overflow well, we need to understand the other-regarding point of gentle virtues.”36 One virtue the Nietzschean clearly endorses is honesty, and there may be a recognition on the part of the strong of the honest vulnerability of others. Martha Nussbaum, in her discussion on Nietzsche and ‘pity’ distinguishes between “bourgeois vulnerability” and “basic vulnerability.”37 Bourgeois vulnerabilities include the pains of loneliness, poor reputation, minor illness, etc., while basic vulnerabilities would includes the deprivation of necessities and basic desires for life. This distinction challenges the Nietzschean to distinguish between pity or compassion that is based on masked selfishness, fear, or vanity, and pity or compassion that is based on the other’s basic vulnerability such as lack of food, shelter, etc., and also the effects of chance that leaves the other vulnerable, not out of the other’s weakness but due to chance. This is where Hursthouse wins and forces the Nietzschean on her turf. It is true that there are exceptional individuals who may resist the second (species preservation) and fourth (good functioning of the social whole) ends, but these individuals are not evaluated on an altogether different standard but, rather, they must express strength well. Part of expressing strength well and giving is recognizing the value of the “gentle” other-regarding virtues. Swanton writes, “What is lacking in a response of pity, as Nietzsche describes it, is expression of the correct or apt feelings and attitudes.”38 A strong and self-commanding person may pity others out of the honest recognition of vulnerability, not out of vanity, fear, or anger. He or she will be empathetic and caring with “ a vivid sense of the great importance of external goods for a good life.”39 This fits nicely into Hursthouse’s naturalistic account of certain species-specific needs and desires essential for living well, and living well is to live in accordance with the virtues.40
Swanton concludes by claiming that she has shown that the “virtues of strength and gentleness are not properly virtues unless they are understood in their thick accounts as suitably infused with aspects of ‘gentleness’ and ‘strength’ respectively.”41 The ‘gentle’ virtues of pity, compassion, and charity may “disqualify the altruistic response as virtuous”42 if hidden behind such expressions are cloaked disvalues of vanity (for “being someone who gives”) or fear (the recognition that oneself may end up being vulnerable someday and so one gives in order to only get back later). That said, ‘strength’ must be expressed well, recognizing the needs of others. Here Hursthouse can force the Nietzschean’s hand through her naturalistic account of species-specific needs and desires, something I am convinced the Nietzschean will agree to given the general Nietzschean affinity for naturalism and biological necessity.
Conclusion
What, then, is the status of Hursthouse’s third thesis, and thus the status of the relationship between the individual and social ends? How interrelated are the virtues that benefit the individual and those that make the possessor a good human being qua human being (in light of the social ends). The notion that there either is no fixed human nature, or there are multiple human natures, causes numerous difficulties for Hursthouse. There seem to be two possible revisions along these lines for Hursthouse. In the first case of no fixed human nature, the second thesis---if it is to remain interrelated with the first thesis---would have to be altered in such a way that the virtues would make their possessor a good type since human nature as such is radically malleable and there is no “human being qua human being” possible. Or, alternatively, in the second case in which there are multiple natures, the virtues would make their possessor a good human qua type (whatever type that may be). Notice the difference here. To say that the virtues would make their possessor a good type really does force different evaluations for these different types with no justifiable means for an ethical naturalist to provide any virtue standard across types (since there is no fixed nature to appeal to).43 When one claims that the virtues would make their possessor a good human qua type, however, there is a base for evaluation that may also allow for variation among types. The commonalities across types would have to be delineated, but the example of compassion in the face of “basic vulnerability” is a good example. It is here, in this second form of my revision of Hursthouse’s second thesis, where the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak/gentle’ come together as infused with aspects of each other. Hursthouse herself uses examples of wolves and “good leader-of-the-pack wolves”44, yet she does not see in her example the order of rank between the leader and those who follow, but only that there is some variation in function even amongst non-human animals.45 As there are examples amongst non-human animals of natural differences in function, so there are also such differences amongst humans, and given our added complexity, maybe these differences are more substantial or more numerous.46
This alteration, I think, is what the Nietzschean challenge brings to the table if Hursthouse is going to take the Nietzschean seriously, even if she only addresses the Nietzschean in her own terms. The Nietzschean exposes the possibility of much greater variation amongst people and thus the threat to the relationship between the individual and social ends. That said, Hursthouse has the opportunity to alter her ethical outlook to allow for more variation along the lines of different types, but the human base is still there and she can still appeal to the ‘gentle’ virtues of compassion and pity in the face of basic vulnerabilities of human beings. There is no clear opposition between strong and gentle virtues, but rather a relationship between the two that serves as the basis for evaluation of humans qua type. The exceptional individual may still only give out of an “overfullness of life” but he or she must do so well, and while he or she may not care about benefiting the social whole as such, just by being virtuous qua type he or she is benefiting the social whole. This requires, of course, that certain vices be eliminated due to that human base of needs and desires in order for human flourishing. This reduces to discussion about violence, lying, etc as being bad expressions of such strength and healthy exuberance (I think this is not to difficult to do, and something Nietzsche would have accepted). Perhaps, after all is said and done, the greatest lesson Hursthouse can take is that we should be more reserved and stoic about our pity and compassion, not doling such sympathy out for those bourgeois vulnerabilities most of us have, but rather, encouraging ‘strength’ in the other. Perhaps the Nietzschean’s most important lesson to learn is that the other is truly important and does deserve sympathy and ‘gentleness’ in the face of basic vulnerabilities that threaten survival.
References
Foot, Philippa. “Nietzsche’s Immoralism” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality ed. by Richard Schacht (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, p. 3-14)
Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
MacIntyre, Alasdair. DependentRational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues(Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Antichrist trans. by Walter Kaufmann in
Kaufmann (ed.) The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Vintage Books, 1966)
---------The Gay Science trans. by Walter Kaufmann ( New York: Random House, 1974 ).
---------Twilight of the Idols, trans Walter Kaufmann in Kaufmann (ed.) The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).
--------- Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by Walter Kaufmann ( New York: Viking Press,1954).
Nussbaum, Martha. “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism” in Richard Schacht (ed.)
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality ( Los Angeles: University of California Press,1994, p. 139-167)
Swanton, Christine. “The Supposed Tension Between ‘Strength’ and ‘Gentleness’ Conceptions of the Virtues” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1997), p.497-510.