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Garcia's Volitional Account of Racism: Defending the Heart
February 20, 2004
In the recent literature on race and racism, Jorge Garcia has provided a distinctive account of racism which places it first and foremost in the heart of the racist. Garcia believes that racism is primarily a matter of the attitudes, feelings, and intentions of individuals, not of the beliefs of individuals nor oppressive societal structures. Garcia calls his view "volitional" and makes racism fundamentally a vice---an ill-will or disregard for some individual or group based on some racial assignment. I wish to defend this view here and contrast it with the belief-based account of racism given by David Theo Goldberg. I will thus narrow my focus to the non-cognitive/cognitive issue with regard to race without exploring all the features of each thinker's explanation of racism. Racism, it will be argued, is not fundamentally a matter of beliefs which may be discredited (due to their irrationality or falsehood), but about the moral attitudes of individuals. The paper will be broken into three sections, the first outlining Garcia's theory, the second outlining Goldberg's theory, and the third defending Garcia's account and briefing exploring some possible avenues that could lead to a clearer understanding regarding race and the problem of explanation.
Section One: Garcia's Volitional Account
Garcia's analysis of racism is distinctive in its challenge to the traditional conceptions of racism, especially those of the last several decades that have often relied on structuralist accounts. Garcia first places racism in the individual---he is a methodological individualist with regard to race. Furthermore, Garcia resurrects virtue theory, claiming that the racist is morally vicious and that racism is a "kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people"(1) and most viciously, a "hatred, ill-will, directed against a person or persons on account of their assigned race."(2) Racism is, at its heart, in the heart. Garcia's view of racism is informed by his more general approval of virtue ethics in moral theory.(3) Racism is not essentially about beliefs but about intentions, likes, dislikes, and moral virtue and vice. He refers to his account as volitional or motivational/volitional(4) in contrast to doctrinal (ideological) or doxastic (belief) accounts, since racism, for him, is a matter of what one wishes and wills for others (and perhaps for oneself) first and foremost. Racism involves a contempt and disregard or opposition to the well-being of an individual or group based on that individual or group's racial assignment.
Garcia makes it clear that there need not be any races, but that people at least make such racial "distinctions in their hearts, whether consciously or not, on the basis of their (or others') racial classifications."(5) The truth or falsity of these classifications is irrelevant, all that matters is that distinctions are made, that people perceive that such differences actually exist.
What does Garcia say about beliefs and institutions? He thinks that beliefs and institutions are indeed racist when they are grounded in a more fundamental racist attitude, so a belief is "racist when rooted in prior racial disregard"(6) and an institution is racist "when racism extends from the hearts of individual people to become institutionalized."(7) Institutionalized racism results from an "infection" of moral disregard from the heart to the system and gets codified in rules, regulations, customs, norms, etc. These racist institutions may "continue to operate on what were originally racist restrictions even at a later time when no one any longer administers them in pursuit of racist ends."(8) Garcia holds that beliefs and institutions may mutually reinforce individual racist ill-will over time, but the moral disregard is prior. To combat racism is to affect the hearts of individuals, not to engage in debate over the rationality or justifiability of opinions or the truth value of certain beliefs. Nor does changing the structural systems and institutions overcome racism, what is fundamentally necessary is changing the underlying attitudes and feelings of individual racists.
Section Two: Goldberg's Belief Account
Goldberg's theory is more complex than a simple reduction to individual beliefs, but I will restrict my focus to that aspect of his larger theory.(9) He depicts racism "in terms of a model for picking out racists on the basis of the kinds of beliefs they hold" and racists are those who "assign racial preferences, or explain racial differences as natural, inevitable . . . or express desired, intended, or actual inclusions or exclusions, entitlements, or restrictions."(10) Goldberg devotes a lot of energy to engaging in a rationality/irrationality debate regarding racist beliefs and how such beliefs (which may sometimes be rational, according to him) may lead to policies and practices which are exclusionary.(11) He writes that "racist expressions . . . are informed by beliefs. The involve enunciations of racist principles, supposed justifications of differences, advantages, claims to superiority . . . "(12) This talk of "principles," "justifications," and "claims" makes clear the cognitive dimension of Goldberg's position. Racists make ascriptions about other people based on some perceived difference that is deemed inferior.
Like Garcia, Goldberg's account does not depend on there being races, nor does it depend on coherent conceptions of race on the part of racists---"racial characteristics may be only loosely and perhaps unthinkingly ascribed to others."(13) Yet, apparently it "is of conceptual necessity that racists are (often only implicitly) committed to some notion of race."(14) So, clear conceptions of race are not needed by racists, but it is conceptually necessary that racists have an idea of race, coherent or not. While Garcia's view requires that individuals feel that there are inferior races, Goldman requires some sort of conception of race, but it is not exactly clear how well-defined and lucid this conception need be, and he does not think that "decisions" made in the "heart" are enough to explain racism. Goldberg also tells us how institutions become racist. In his view, institutions require "formative principles" that "serve to prompt and perpetuate the racist beliefs and acts in question."(15) The institution must be founded on principles that promote racial exclusion. Thus, institutionalized racism results from certain racial conceptions of social subjectivity. This is not a view of "infection" as such, but one of established practices based on beliefs communicated in a given discourse. Furthermore, since race is within a field of discourse, and there are a variety of institutional instantiations, there is no single racism, but a range of racisms.(16) This is very different than Garcia's view, which claims that there is one racism---reducible to the heart of racists. Thus, the approaches that Garcia and Goldberg would employ to combat the problem of racism would be very different, not only because of the cognitive versus non-cognitive issue, but because they differ on how many types of racism there are. I will address this issue of combating racism (which will aid in my defense of Garcia) in the last section.
Section Three: In Defense of Garcia: The Advantages of the Volitional Account
There are many advantages to the volitional theory. Garcia actually sees a belief-based account as a detriment, claiming that his theory benefits from not being a matter of belief and pre-judgments. He claims that one can "hold prejudices about people assigned to a race without herself being racist"(17)since the belief is held for non-racist reasons (lacking racial disregard). Someone may believe that "whites are superior to blacks" and actually seek to help black people in his community. While this is a condescending opinion, it is not clear at all that he is a racist. A person may hold such a belief for innocent reasons, "taking it I deserved good faith from normally trustworthy people. In that case, se will hold a (normally objectionable opinion) but in an unobjectionable way."(18) Someone can hold an opinion that is ignorant, or one can be misinformed about the "facts" and believe that one race is inferior, but it seems much too strong to call this person a racist. This case is one in which Garcia's account avoids. Opinions are not central to racism, moral viciousness is. The innocent person who is simply ignorant does not come to such a belief out of moral disregard, but does so from being misguided about racial equality.
Another advantage to Garcia's view is that it presents a clear picture why racism is always immoral. Racism's "immorality stems from its being opposed to the virtues of benevolence and justice."(19) While some have argued that the morality component to Garcia's theory is not necessary to explaining racism,(20) I think that it is an important advantage for Garcia and since the morality question is thus not an external question separated from definitions of racism. I think such separation may be harmful. Treating racism as primarily (or totally) a cognitive matter does not capture the fundamental hatred that is at the very root of racism's violence and horror. A non-cognitive account goes directly to the heart of the matter, not trivializing racism as merely an opinion that must be argued against, but as a fundamentally bad disposition and attitude toward other people.
Garcia critiques Goldberg's account and points out that Goldberg waffles a bit on the matter of beliefs versus intentions, at least when it comes to preferential treatment programs. First of all, on Garcia's view, affirmative action is not racist since there is obviously no moral disregard involved. Goldberg also seems to bring in motivations and volitions as well. He writes "Certainly is not the aim of preferential treatment programs to exclude anyone on racial grounds; the undertaking is to include."(21) Garcia jumps on this, pointing out that Goldberg's focus on the "aim" of such policies leads him to the question of motivations and goals, not to beliefs and effects of beliefs.(22)
Goldberg also opens up the door to individual's feelings and dispositions in his "attack" on the possibility of moral education combating racism. Now his criticism of moral education's ability to overcome racism is supposedly due to the fact that it is not overtly clear that racism is always irrational, or at least there are no obvious contradictions in many racist beliefs. He states that "nothing short of structural transformation and discursive displacement will help" and that "moral education aims to encourage agents to give up racist behavior by altering racist feelings and thoughts."(23) One has to ask: Where does this talk of "feelings" come from, Goldberg?" He says that moral education will not work since the question of its effectiveness will always be at issue, that is, there is no way one can know that racist feelings and thoughts are truly altered. So, part of the effectiveness of such education would stem from altering feelings, according to Goldberg. It is not clear how large a role in the effectiveness of such education altering feelings would play, since Goldberg introduces the problem of racist feelings at the end of his discussion, seemingly as a throw-in which he does not have to address head-on.
I do not mean to say that Goldberg gives any priority to motivations, feelings, and aims over beliefs, but just that they do invade his theory in some areas. The reason for this invasion, in my view, is due to just how strong and deep-rooted the problem of racist feelings is. How can something primarily based on cognitive states(24)lead to the destruction of lives and the terror of murder, rape, lynching, and genocide? Do people believe so strongly about racial difference and hierarchy that they will slaughter, torture, and humiliate other people of an "inferior" race? I do not see how beliefs, rational or irrational, produce such acts. There has to be a deeper resource for the production of such violence. Garcia's volitional account can explain these types of acts because it goes deep down to often gut-level animosities and contempt---his theory can account for some of the seemingly unconscious reactive racially-based outbursts (merely verbal or physical) of violence which plague society. It is clear that beliefs can influence feelings and reinforce racist attitudes, but it cannot be the beliefs that are the determining factor for the terror of racism. Much of the debate between the cognitive and non-cognitive positions seems to focus on how much of the phenomenon (or, for some, phenomena) of racism can be explained either way, that is, which one has the greater influence, are they equally involved, etc. But this does not get to the quality of racism. This does get to what goes on for both the victims of racism and their racist victimizers. The experience of racism and racist attitudes gets overlooked. Garcia brings attention to these issues by locating racism primarily in the heart instead of the head.
I would like to propose two paths for further analysis in race theory relating to this issue. First of all, race in America is very different than race in the rest of the world, and thus racism is very different as well. The discourse on race must never treat the American case as the case to base a theory on. It is clear that racism is context-dependent in many ways, even though I hold that within any context explanation must go down to the individual level. Theorizing about race and racism in America presents the difficulty of narrowing the matter down to a rather unusual scenario.
The second avenue deals with how racists become non-racists. What actually changes? Does belief-content change or do the feelings toward the other change, or both? I think that the notion of resistance can be used here to aid theory. First, if social structures are the true agents of racism, how has resistance to this racism ever come about? From where do social structures of racism get overturned if not by individuals who "have changed their ways"? Furthermore, what is it in those individuals that leads them to resist. Can a new and improved belief-system actually overcome the stubbornness and unwillingness to change one's position regarding those of another racial group? I highly doubt that such resistance to racism results from a change in belief-content. Racism is often too deeply rooted for that; racism lies beyond cognitive formulations---it is in the heart (and so is anti-racism). Perhaps it is the case that people see injustice, violence, and terror and react against it, feeling something and realizing that change needs to occur both in their own hearts and in the hearts of others.
This is a reversal of the traditional way of approaching the issue. Usually attention is given to how structures or individuals are racist and how the two may affect or infect the other. Instead, I propose a parallel move in theorizing that also calls attention to how individuals (and structures and institutions, if you like) lose their racism.(25)This may clarify the debate between the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches I have discussed here (and I think help Garcia's account, ultimately). Discussions on resistance as well as resistance-to-change would provide a more experiential-based analysis of what is most fundamentally an experience.