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Anxiety and Authenticity: The Possibility for an Ethics?
October 27, 2003
Martin Heidegger's work deals with the issue of human mortality and the human condition as much as any other philosopher, and perhaps as much as any other writer. Heidegger brings out fundamental questions regarding existence and what it means to be human, and his greatest work, Being and Time, does this as well as any piece of literature one may name. Here I focus on a small, but crucial part of Being and Time which seems to exemplify major themes of Heidegger's work as a whole (especially the early Heidegger). What follows is a brief analysis of the concept of Angst (hereafter translated as anxiety), its relation to the possibility of an authentic existence for the human being, and how this raises a serious question regarding the possibility of an ethics based on Heidegger's thought(1).
To undertake this project, I believe it is necessary to briefly discuss the issue of "falling prey" (2) as it appears right before the discussion of the attunement of anxiety. After giving an account of "idle talk," "curiosity," and "ambiguity," Heidegger discusses the falling prey to the they as a falling away of Dasein from itself. That is, falling prey is the "move" of Dasein's absorption into the they, and this falling is, in some sense, the opposite of the distinctive attunement of anxiety that throws Dasein back onto oneself existentially.
Section One: Falling prey to the they and the "self-dissection" of Dasein
Dasein is "for the most part together with the world . . . this absorption in . . . mostly has the character of being lost in the publicness of the they."(3) Dasein is lost in the anonymity of the they. Dasein is not with itself (coincidentally with) but with the world. It is important to remember as a bit of an aside that this falling to the they is constitutive of Dasein and not some temporary condition to be eradicated from human existence in some better objective state of affairs (such as social/economic changes). In fact, most of our time is spent in the they, lost in it since this is really our "state" when we interact with the things and people in the world on an everyday, and often pre-reflective, basis. It could be said that this falling prey is not something to be weary about as "possibly happening someday" but rather understood as the structure of Dasein's normal everyday involvement in the world.
Heidegger describes three main factors of falling prey. First, one is tempted into falling into the they at all times. This temptation is a seduction to the world and away from Dasein itself. Second, there is a tranquilization of Dasein. One who is tranquil is in a state of sedated busyness. One is captured in a type of tranquility and peace with existence, yet one can be very busy in this entanglement with the world. In fact, such busyness and tranquility go hand in hand, for Heidegger. One becomes more involved and entangled with the world when one is at peace with one's existence and the world itself. Third, Dasein is alienated. When falling prey to the they, one's "ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed."(4) In alienation one just feels like something is amiss with oneself, that something about oneself is not being fulfilled, not being expressed.
This alienation is due to the lostness of oneself into the they. That said, the effect of alienation, according to Heidegger, is that one turns on oneself---not the they---and begins a "self-dissection which tries out all kinds of possibilities of interpretation, with the result that the 'characterologies' and 'typologies' which it points out are themselves too numerous to grasp."(5) A more thorough description of this is important. Here is the beginning of Dasein's being thrown back onto itself. Now this "thrown back onto" is inauthentic since one is lost in the they searching for one's own possibilities and identity in the they itself, but Dasein begins to dissect itself. So already, prior to anxiety, there is turn inward. Now what is the crucial difference is that the dissection and turn inward of falling prey is the turn inward that finds only the they where in fact one's own potential should be(6). We shall see how anxiety discloses oneself to oneself a bit later.
When one begins this self-dissection, one also begins a rather murderous re-evaluation of oneself. This re-evaluation is only an exercise in trying on masks provided by the they, that is, one is mired in interpretations of oneself which are provided by the they. Now Heidegger is quick to point out that this alienation and self-dissection is not a "surrender" to the they, but a turn inward (inauthentic) onto oneself in which one entangles oneself. This is the "plunge"(7). The self-understanding involved in this dissection shies away from authentic possibilities and into the peace of having an answer for oneself, for a definition that has ultimately been given by the they(8) and with which one can feel at ease (or at home---see section two below). Dasein eddies in the interpretations of the they given to Dasein from outside (although Dasein has turned inward to find such interpretations!). One succumbs to the they and the interpretations of oneself given to the understanding by the they, and it appears that one's ability for understanding oneself without the they's input is lost. One's possibility is stripped from oneself in this alienation and what is most dangerous (although Heidegger may not inject such a value claim) is the accompanying tranquilization which makes this lost of possibility and self-determination seem okay. Furthermore, it is very difficult (it seems) because one is not an isolated I-subject that can treat the world and the they as an object. One is already and always engaged with the world and other beings, and to take a position which distances oneself within this context and allows for an end to the murderous self-dissection may seem near impossible. However, the attunement of anxiety is distinctive and discloses Dasein to itself in a unique and powerful way. It is anxiety to which I shall turn next.
Section Two: Anxiety and the potential for one's grasping of one's own possibility
Anxiety is a distinctive attunement that reveals Dasein to itself in a way, which makes apparent the truth that one is confronted with one's possibilities really at all times. Anxiety is primordial and one escapes from it, it is not that is one is lost in the they "first" and runs toward being-anxious. Anxiety is underlying because it is the mode that reveals one important condition of being human---it shows that one has one's own possibility to grasp with the knowledge that one is finite. I will now outline the main aspects of anxiety that Heidegger discusses.
The absorption into the they is really a flight from Dasein itself. Dasein seeks out the comfort of the they, evading the call to Dasein's own potential. All flight is flight from something, and whatever one flees, according to Heidegger, is revealed phenomenally (or at least in this specific instance of falling prey and authenticity). One' freedom has been abandoned in the flight into the they. Dasein flees from itself and is thus revealed to itself.
Anxiety is indefinite, and thus is unlike fear. Fear is the state of being afraid of some particular being in the world; some definite innerworldly thing coming from a definite location is what causes fright. In contrast, anxiety comes from nowhere and is about nothing. There is really no-thing that is bothersome, but a presence of dread that one cannot put one's finger on. Anxiety is just "there" and does not come from anywhere. Heidegger states that anxiety is thus "about" the world as such and my being-in-the-world. All things and innerworldly beings are interchangeable; the contents of the world do not matter since it is existence in the world as world that one is concerned about and what one is anxious about. The world is revealed as a unity that confronts Dasein in the very mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world. What "matters" for Dasein in anxiety is its being-in-the-world, and the world takes on a general character while Dasein takes on a specific character since anxiety individualizes. This world-generalized and Dasein-specified reveals to Dasein an understanding of itself as relying on itself in an abyss of generality which is the world. Dasein cannot seek justification or meaning for itself in the world or in the they. Dasein is thrown back upon itself for its own justification and for determining its own possibility as a "potentiality-for-being-in-the-world."(9)
Although anxiety reveals Dasein's care about its being-in-the-world and its involvement in the world, anxiety also individuates, that is, singles out Dasein to itself. Anxiety "discloses Dasein as being-possible, and indeed as what can be individualized in individuation of its own accord."(10) Dasein is confronted with its own ability to separate itself for itself apart from the world and from other beings. The power of individuality (one's own possibility) is in the hands of Dasein itself. Dasein can grasp itself in its potential, in fact, one's potential to realize one's possibility is only a task for Dasein itself---the world cannot authenticate Dasein. What is disclosed here may be characterized as being-alone, even though anxiety presents Dasein with its own existence in the world. Since Dasein can only rely on itself for a true grasping of its possibilities one is alone in the construction of meaning. The world appears arbitrary---it is just there, as Dasein is also just there in the world, and thus there is no objective validity or meaning to be discovered in the world. Dasein is responsible for the bestowal of meaning onto the world, interpreting the world this way or that. This does not mean that one creates objects or the objective order, but rather the meaning-disclosure of such objects. Anxiety throws Dasein back onto itself in order to confront Dasein with choice---choosing to be, choosing who to be, and choosing what meaning to existence one will grant.
Anxiety is distinctive in the way it discloses Dasein to itself. There is an almost unnerving "uncanny feeling"(11) which destroys Dasein's comfortable position in the world as some absorbed participant in the meaninglessness of public anonymity. In section one, I discussed the tranquility of the entanglement in the they and the feeling of being at ease or at home while being absorbed in busied everydayness. Anxiety obliterates this at home feeling. Familiar pacified existence is lost when Dasein is thrown back onto itself and its potential for authenticity. The uncanniness of anxiety "constantly pursues Dasein and threatens its everyday lostness in the they, although not explicitly."(12) Anxiety haunts the absorbed Dasein busy in the world who is ignoring the call of authenticity. This discomfort with one's being-in-the-world that anxiety stirs up and brings to the fore is the burden of authentic being.
Now I do not want to mislead and say that the self-dissection which falling prey causes will always bring about, or trigger, anxiety. Anxiety may indeed just come forward inexplicably and for no apparent reason. However, extreme self-dissection and extreme reflective lostness in the they seems to increase the likelihood of anxiety's uncanny presence. By "reflective lostness" I mean the conscious running through the interpretations given by or found in the they which genuinely challenges Dasein's understanding of itself. Now Dasein in this reflective lostness is still lost. Dasein is still inauthentic and will only find the they in this exaggerated self-dissection. I make a distinction between reflective and unreflective falling prey to the they because the busyness of reflection is different than the busyness of unreflective involvement. In reflection one is busy with one's inauthentic self and perhaps one's behavior presented to other beings-in-the-world, but one is not necessarily accepting of this inauthenticity. One may be very displeased with being lost in the circle of characterologies and typologies that come from the they, and may be more displeased with the growing sense of an inability to ever get away from this circle and to get away from the they when it comes to a meaningful appropriation of oneself. This displeasure (and contempt for the they) builds and seems to trigger anxiety.(13)
In anxiety, one no long engages in self-dissection, but rather comes face to face with the possibility making something of oneself. One is not at home comfortable with the public they but thrown back onto oneself in the face of one's possibility and finitude. There is no more clinging to innerworldly beings for support. I believe that a more intense dissection of self (reflective) resulting from falling prey to the they starts the process of Dasein's questioning of the "very ground of its being" which results in the "physiological triggering of [anxiety]."(14) This triggering then removes Dasein from dissection and the eddy of they-interpretation into the concrete grasping of one's ownmost existence.
Section three: What about ethics?
We are left with a rather perplexing situation when one considers the necessity of social interaction and some sort of standard of moral conduct or any ethics based on duties or obligations to other people. On the one hand, there is the meaninglessness of the they and Dasein's absorption into public anonymity. Here the individual is lost, he or she has no authentic identity and thus the question of the possibility of personal responsibility must be raised. On the other hand, anxiety reveals to Dasein its own individualization, a principium individuationis. Dasein cannot rely on the world for justification or meaning for itself. In fact, in anxiety Dasein must choose itself in spite of the world. One must take a stand and make a choice in the face of the world that is arbitrary.When Dasein grasps the world and itself as an authentic possibility for itself what is the guarantee that this authenticity can possibly remain when one is not anxious, when one returns to one's involvement in the world? Is the question then of being-absorbed or not-being-absorbed, or even of degrees of absorption in the they? Can a transformation of Dasein take place such that Dasein remains authentic in its busied involvement with the world?
The answers to these questions require a detailed discussion, but I will make a few comments. The main problem as I see it is the necessity of Dasein to hold the world in contempt (for Dasein's being-in is inauthentic) why Dasein chooses itself in spite of the arbitrary world. How, then, can one be expected to treat other beings without such contempt? I will offer two avenues for exploration at solving this problem: an ethics of care that may be found in feminist ethics, and a re-defining friendship/community (or clarifying what those terms do in fact mean).
The ethics of care has the benefit of a key Heideggerian term, care. Perhaps the authentic individual is authenticated through its care for itself and those other beings one cares about (for whatever reason). This would keep the individuality of oneself since the care for these other humans is still my care---the sense of mineness remains. One is immersed into a world and finds oneself entered in caring relations with others, it seems that in almost all cases, care for others is also just there, and not just in the sense that one is involved meaningfully with others. This line of thought relating to a feminist ethics deriving from Heidegger could sidestep the question of the gender of Dasein(15) and move directly to care and notions of love, respect, affection, etc.
Perhaps what would be excluded from this, however, is the question of who one cares about or should care about. A feminist ethics of care may be xenophobic unless it appeals to a notion such as universal love. Perhaps this xenophobia can be overcome with an analysis of friendship and community. What are the conditions of friendship and true communion with others? In my view the friend does not provide unconditional acceptance as such since this creates an environment of comfort an at homeness which one can be absorbed into. Instead I propose a delimitation of the notion of friendship in order to embrace agonistic relations. Such a community provides a challenge to each individual (possibly stirring anxiety) and is not limited to those who one is directly related to or who are "friends" as usually understood. This has implications for politics and issues regarding immigration, foreign policy, trade, etc. This has broad cosmopolitan possibilities a seemingly radical departure from self-centered Dasein, yet it seems that all we ultimately can do for each other is to provide an environment which is best served for allowing individuals to become authentic. The Heideggerian analyses of anxiety and authenticity (and the problem of the they) may be problematic for the construction of an ethics, but this problem may in fact be a necessary one if one is interested in the individual at all(16).
Footnotes